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Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of 
cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies.  Observational 
data suggest that a wide variety of behaviors may spread in human social 
networks, but subjects in such studies can choose to befriend people with similar 
behaviors, posing difficulty for causal inference.  Here, we exploit a seminal set of 
laboratory experiments that originally showed that voluntary costly punishment 
can help sustain cooperation.  In these experiments, subjects were randomly 
assigned to a sequence of different groups in order to play a series of single-shot 
public goods games with strangers; this feature allowed us to draw networks of 
interactions to explore how cooperative and uncooperative behavior spreads from 
person to person to person.  We show that, in both an ordinary public goods game 
and in a public goods game with punishment, focal individuals are influenced by 
fellow group members’ contribution behavior in future interactions with other 
individuals who were not a party to the initial interaction.  Furthermore, this 
influence persists for multiple periods and spreads up to three degrees of 
separation (from person to person to person to person).  The results suggest that 
each additional contribution a subject makes to the public good in the first period 
is tripled over the course of the experiment by other subjects who are directly or 
indirectly influenced to contribute more as a consequence.  These are the first 
results to show experimentally that cooperative behavior cascades in human social 
networks. 
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Introduction 
Scholars studying the evolution of cooperation in humans have recently turned 
their attention to the role of social networks in structuring human interactions (1–10).  
Interacting with others in large populations without structure greatly reduces the 
likelihood of cooperation (11), but in a fixed social network, cooperation can evolve as 
a consequence of repeated interactions because of “social viscosity,” even in the 
absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity (1–2).  Different network structures 
can speed or slow selection, and, in some cases, they can completely determine the 
outcome of a frequency-dependent selection process (3).  Heterogeneity in the 
interaction topology can improve prospects for cooperation (4), and adaptive selection 
of network ties by individuals on evolving graphs can also influence the evolution of 
behavioral types (5–7). 
However, this theoretical literature has not explored whether cooperative behavior 
actually spreads across ties in human social networks, and recent experimental work has 
tended to focus on coordination rather than cooperation (12–13).  A growing number of 
observational studies suggest that diverse phenomena can spread from person to person 
to person, including obesity (14), happiness (15), ideas (16) and many other behaviors 
and affective states (17–20).  But causal effects are difficult to extract from 
observational network studies because similarity in observed attributes among 
connected individuals may result from homophily, the tendency to connect to others 
who exhibit similar traits or behaviors (21).  For example, past work has shown that 
people who engage in acts of altruism tend to befriend others who do the same (22).  
Causal effects are also difficult to extract from observational studies because 
associations between connected individuals might be due to shared exposure to 
contextual factors that simultaneously engender various behaviors (including 
cooperation) in both parties.   
4 
Experimental studies can overcome these problems via random assignment of 
interactions in a controlled fashion.  For example, a recent field experiment (23) showed 
that a door-to-door canvasser who encourages a resident to vote influences not only the 
person who answers the door but a second person in the household as well, even though 
there was no direct contact between the second person and the canvasser.  But such 
studies experimentally showing person to person-to-person effects are rare.  Prior 
experimental work on spreading processes in networks has focused primarily on direct 
person-to-person effects – for example with respect to the dyadic spread of studiousness 
(24), positive moods (25–26), and weight loss (27).  
Not everything spreads between connected individuals, of course, and not 
everything that spreads does so by the same mechanism.  For example, while the spread 
of emotional states, smiling, or yawning may be rooted in fundamental 
neurophysiological processes (28), the spread of behaviors may arise from the spread of 
social norms or from other psychosocial processes, such as various types of innate 
mimicry (29).  In the particular case of cooperation or altruistic behavior, it is well 
known that one person’s altruism towards another can elicit reciprocal altruism in 
repeated paired interactions (direct reciprocity) (30) and also in groups (31–32). Indeed, 
many individuals are “conditional cooperators” who give more if others give more and 
who are influenced in their interactions with others by what the others are doing during 
the interaction (33–34).  And it is also well known that reputation mechanisms which 
provide information about a person’s past behavior can help to sustain cooperation 
(indirect reciprocity) (35).   
However, no work so far has considered the possibility that witnessing 
cooperative or uncooperative behavior might, by various mechanisms, including innate 
mimicry, promote changes in cooperative behavior that might then be transmitted across 
social network ties to others who were not part of the original interaction.  That is, quite 
distinct from prior work, we are concerned with whether such behavior can create 
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cascades of similar cooperative or uncooperative behavior in others, spreading from 
person to person to person, even when reputations are unknown and reciprocity is not 
possible.  If so, it suggests that social contagion may also play an important role in the 
evolution of cooperation. 
To study the spread of cooperative and uncooperative behavior in human social 
networks, we analyzed a set of previously published public goods game experiments 
(36).  In these experiments, subjects were placed into groups of four, and each subject 
was given 20 money units (MUs).  They then had to decide how many MUs (between 0 
and 20) to keep or contribute to a group project.  Each MU contributed to the group 
project would yield 0.4 MUs for each of the four group members.  This set-up allows us 
to study cooperative behavior because each MU contributed is costly to the individual 
(0.4MU – 1MU = –0.6MU) but beneficial to the group (4 x 0.4MU –1MU = +0.6MU).  
If each group member keeps all MUs privately, they will each earn 20MUs, and if each 
group member makes the maximum contribution of 20MUs to the group project, they 
will each earn 32MUs.  But in spite of this opportunity to improve group outcomes, 
each individual can always earn more by contributing less. 
In the basic public goods game analyzed here, subjects made contribution 
decisions without initially seeing their fellow group members’ decisions, but all 
contributions were revealed to each group member at the conclusion of the game, along 
with payoff outcomes.  In an alternate version, subjects played an identical public goods 
game, but, after viewing their fellow group members’ contributions, they were allowed 
to spend up to 10MUs to “punish” each of the other group members.  Each 1MU spent 
reduced the target’s income by 3MUs.  In both versions of the experiment, subjects 
participated in a total of six repetitions (“periods”) of the public goods game.  This 
allowed the researchers to show that contributions tend to decline in the basic public 
goods game, and increase in the public goods game with punishment (36). 
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Importantly, to distinguish the effect of punishment on cooperation from the effect 
of direct reciprocity (30), indirect reciprocity (35), reputation (37), and costly signaling 
(38), the research design enforced strict anonymity between subjects, and no subject 
was ever paired with any other subject more than once.  As shown in Fig.1, this feature 
of the experimental design allows us to construct networks of interactions where each 
connection is defined by the ability of one subject to observe the contribution behavior 
of another subject in the preceding period (because they were in the same group).  Since 
random assignment rules out processes like homophily and contextual effects, a 
significant association in the public goods contributions of directly connected 
individuals suggests that one subject’s cooperative or uncooperative behavior causally 
influences another person’s behavior during his interactions with other, new subjects in 
the following period.  Moreover, we can analyze associations between indirectly 
connected individuals to see whether such effects spread from person to person to 
person.  For example, subject F may influence subject E who in turn influences subject 
A (see Fig.1), even though A did not interact with F or observe F’s behavior.  The 
mechanism of the effect of F upon A, of course, occurs via the effect of F on E and the 
subsequent effect of E on A. 
 
Results 
A summary of the raw data (Fig. 2) shows that, indeed, future contributions by 
focal individuals (“egos”) are significantly related to the amount contributed by each 
group member with whom the ego interacted in the previous period (“alters”) in both 
the basic public goods game and the public goods game with punishment.  However, the 
raw relationship does not take into account constraints on the amount subjects can give 
(specifically, many subjects choose to contribute the minimum or maximum possible 
amounts).  Nor does it take into account the fact that there are multiple observations for 
each ego and each alter within and between periods.  We therefore use an interval 
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regression technique with clustered standard errors (see Methods) to estimate the size of 
the causal effect of one subject’s contribution behavior on another.  We focus on the 
effect of each alter independently rather than each group of alters because it allows us to 
take into account ceiling and floor effects that occur at the individual level (see 
Methods).  It also helps us conceptually to identify the spillover effect of a single 
individual on the people he or she is connected to, as well as the way this effect can 
subsequently spread to others in the interaction network. 
The results show that alters significantly influence egos’ behavior, both directly 
and indirectly (Fig. 3).  For each 1MU contributed by an alter, ego contributes an 
additional 0.19 MUs (95% C.I. 0.14 to 0.24, p<0.0001) in the next period in the basic 
public goods game and an additional 0.18MUs (0.14 to 0.21, p<0.0001) in the public 
goods game with punishment.  Note that these results summarize the spread of both 
cooperative and uncooperative behavior: alters who give less influence egos to give less 
and alters who give more influence egos to give more.   
Remarkably, even though egos do not observe the contributions of their alters’ 
alters (two degrees of separation), they too significantly affect ego’s contribution 
decisions.  Each 1MU contributed by alter’s alter increases ego contributions by an 
additional 0.07 MUs (0.03 to 0.10, p=0.0005) two periods later in the public goods 
game, and by an additional 0.05 MUs (0.03 to 0.08, p=0.0001) in the public goods game 
with punishment.  These effects reflect the indirect traces of an individual’s actions on 
others via a chain of direct pairwise effects.  Indeed, as expected given the experimental 
set-up, a Sobel test (39) shows that the effect of alter’s alter on ego is mediated by the 
indirect effect that spreads from alter’s alter to alter to ego (see SI).  Furthermore, in the 
public goods game with punishment, we find evidence that cooperative behavior 
spreads one degree farther, up to three degrees of separation.  Each 1MU contributed by 
an alter’s alter’s alter increases ego’s contribution by 0.06 MUs (0.02 to 0.09, p=0.001). 
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As a separate matter, many of these direct and indirect effects endure, influencing 
ego’s behavior long after the initial period of influence (Fig. 4).  For example, F may 
influence E to give more not only in the following period when E interacts with A, I, 
and M, but also in the period after that when E interacts with K, P, and T (see Fig. 1), 
and in other future periods as well.  In the basic public goods game, each 1MU 
contributed by the alter causes ego to contribute an additional 0.15MUs (95% C.I. 0.09 
to 0.21, p<0.0001) two periods later, 0.08MUs (0.00 to 0.16, p=0.04) three periods later, 
0.17MUs (0.07 to 0.27, p=0.001) four periods later, and 0.17MUs (0.00 to 0.33, p=0.05) 
five periods later.  In the public goods game with punishment, each MU contributed by 
the alter causes ego to contribute an additional 0.15MUs (0.10 to 0.19, p<0.0001) two 
periods later, 0.11MUs (0.05 to 0.17, p=0.0001) three periods later, 0.14MUs (0.07 to 
0.21, p=0.0001) four periods later, and 0.14MUs (0.03 to 0.25, p=0.02) five periods 
later.  The effects of alters’ alters decision (and not just the effect of alters’ decision) 
also persist in the basic public goods game after four periods (0.07MUs; 0.01 to 0.13, 
p=0.02) and the public goods game with punishment after three periods (0.14MUs; 0.03 
to 0.25, p=0.007). 
To measure the overall size of these cooperative behavior cascades (see Fig. 5 for 
a hypothetical example), we focus only on those effects with p values less than 0.05 in 
Figs. 3-4.  In the basic public goods game, if a subject increased her contribution by an 
additional 1MU in period 1, it would directly cause the 3 other subjects in her group to 
increase their total contributions by 1.8MUs (95% C.I. 1.3 to 2.3) over the next 4 
periods.  It would also indirectly cause 9 other subjects to increase their total 
contributions by 1.2MUs (0.9 to 1.5) in periods 3 and 5, for an overall increase of 3MUs 
(2.4 to 3.6).  In the public goods game with punishment, the direct increase in 
contributions would be 2.1MUs (1.6 to 2.7) over the next 5 periods and the indirect 
increase would be 0.9MUs (0.7 to 1.0) in periods 3 and 4, also totaling 3MUs (2.4 to 
3.6).  The reverse is also true, and each reduction in one’s contribution in the first period 
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can generate a cascade of uncooperative behavior through parts of the network 
subsequently.  Yet, this exercise suggests that, overall, over the course of each version 
of the public goods game, the spread of cooperative behavior through the network 
approximately triples each additional contribution made in the first period, at least in a 
network of this particular, experimentally controlled structure.  
Finally, we note that in the public goods game with punishment, alters’ alters may 
also influence ego via their punishment behavior.  F might punish E, causing E to 
contribute more after one period, which causes A to contribute more after two periods. 
To test this hypothesis, we regressed ego’s contribution on the punishment alters 
received from others two periods ago (see SI).  And, indeed, we find that punishment 
can spur cooperative cascades as well.  Each punishment point alter’s alter gives to alter 
increases ego’s contribution two rounds later by 0.13MUs (95% C.I. 0.02 to 0.23, 
p=0.02).  However, the effect does not appear to spread any further: the relationship 
between alter’s alter’s alter’s punishment behavior and ego’s contribution three periods 
later is insignificant (p=0.25).  We also failed to find any evidence of spreading 
punishment behavior per se; the association between punishment received in the 
previous round and punishment given in the current round was not significant (p=0.83, 
see SI). 
 
Discussion 
It is often supposed that individuals in experiments like the one described here 
would seek to selfishly maximize their own payoffs.  However, it is worth reiterating 
that most of our subjects violated this supposition: since all interactions are single-shot, 
the equilibrium prediction is to contribute nothing and to pay nothing to punish non-
contributors, yet this was not what the subjects did (36).  One mechanism that may 
underlie such deviations from “rational” action appears to be mimicry: when subjects 
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copy the cooperative behavior of others with whom they interact, it causes them to 
deviate even more from rational self-interest and may help to reinforce this behavior.   
Observational studies suggest that behaviors, knowledge, and emotions spread 
between people with personal social ties (14–20).  Of course, people can be influenced 
by strangers too – for example, in catching a germ, following a worn path on a field, 
imitating a smile, adopting a fashion, or responding to road rage.  In this experiment, 
relationships were anonymous and contact was not sustained.  Nevertheless, there was 
real interaction, and people observed each others’ behavior in the setting of a game that 
they cared about.  A consistent explanation for both the experimental investigations and 
the observational studies is that people mimic the behavior they observe, and that this 
can cause behaviors to spread from person to person to person.  If anything, it seems 
likely that people who are willing to copy strangers’ behavior may be even more likely 
to copy similar behavior in friends in real world settings. 
Although an act of punishment, like a contribution, can initiate a cooperative 
cascade, we found minimal differences in the spread of influence between the basic 
public goods game and the public goods game with punishment.  This suggests that the 
existence of punishment does not fundamentally alter network dynamics: punishment 
may not enhance or facilitate the spread of cooperation per se.  The reason for this may 
be that ego only observes whether alter is cooperating, not the motivations that alter has 
for behaving in a particular way, nor the prior history of interactions that alter himself 
had that may be prompting a particular behavior.  However, punishment clearly has a 
direct effect on contributions, and the network process we describe may help to magnify 
the indirect effect of punishment.  Thus, behavioral cascades may be a crucial part of an 
explanation for how small changes in human institutions (such as informal norms or 
formal rules about punishment) can yield large changes in a group’s behavior.  This is 
all the more remarkable since we found no evidence that punishment itself spreads. 
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This multiplier effect also suggests that behavioral imitation and inter-personal 
spread may be an important factor in the evolution of cooperation in humans.  For 
example, cascades of cooperative (or non-cooperative) behavior can promote 
coordination on a particular strategy, which may decrease within-group variance.  At the 
same time, the path-dependent nature of this process within each group may tend to 
increase between-group variance.  In a population with structured groups, both of these 
effects work in favor of the emergence of altruism (40).  Cascades may also help 
mitigate the negative effect of group size on cooperation (11,41) because they reduce 
the number of independent entities in a population, effectively increasing the size of 
groups in which public goods can be maintained via self-interest.  Evolutionary game 
theorists should therefore consider the possibility that behavioral imitation itself may 
have coevolved with both cooperation and the emergence of social networks.   
Such models might perhaps also help to explain the influence of genetic variation 
on social network structure (42).  Egocentric network characteristics like network 
centrality can make some individuals more susceptible than others to contagions with 
negative outcomes for fitness (like germs, misinformation, and violence).  But the 
results here suggest that one fundamental justification for the existence of elaborate 
social ties in the form of social networks may be that they may allow humans to benefit 
from the actions of widely distributed others, and may also allow them to spread 
beneficial strategies widely enough to benefit others on whom they depend.  Genetic 
variation in social network position suggests that networks may influence reproduction 
or survival via a frequency-dependent selection process or rapid environmental variation 
(relative to evolution); in either case, given that cooperation itself also appears to have a 
genetic basis (43) it makes sense to think about how cooperation may play a role.  
Finally, these results provide experimental support for a conjecture about human 
social networks.  To explain a variety of observational data that show behavior in social 
networks is correlated up to three degrees of separation, but rarely farther, a “three 
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degrees of influence rule” (44) has been described which suggests that 1) behavior can 
spread from person to person to person to person via a diverse set of mechanisms, 
subject to certain constraints, and 2) as a result, each person in a network can influence 
dozens or even hundreds of people, some of whom he or she does not know and has not 
met.  The present results show experimentally that such cascades can occur in a 
controlled environment where people are making decisions about giving to others.  
Other researchers have shown that giving behavior can spread from person to person in 
natural settings, whether it is workplace donations to charity (45) or the decision to 
donate organs (46).  However, it is an open question whether such “pay it forward” 
behavior spreads more widely from person to person to person in natural human 
networks. 
 
 
Materials and Methods 
The procedures for implementing the public goods game experiments for the 240 
subjects analyzed in this report have been described elsewhere (36).  Fig. 1 in the main 
text illustrates that the requirement in these experiments that no two subjects meet each 
other twice ensures that any ego who is directly connected to an alter (one degree of 
separation) cannot also be connected indirectly to the same subject by two degrees of 
separation (an alter’s alter).  It also ensures there are no redundant paths at one and two 
degrees of separation and no subject can be connected to herself by two degrees.  
However, at three and four degrees of separation, such combinations are possible, so we 
remove from the analysis all self-connections and all redundant paths, and we keep just 
one observation from among those with the shortest path length (smallest degree of 
separation).  For example, if at period t subject B is subject A’s alter’s alter’s alter (3 
degrees) via two paths and also his alter’s alter’s alter’s alter (4 degrees) via five paths, 
for the purpose of analysis, we assign a single, randomly chosen observation for this 
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pair to the data in which subject B’s contribution behavior depends on subject A’s 
behavior at t-3. 
To analyze ego contribution behavior, we use interval regression (also known as 
“Tobit” regression), which is typical in the literature on public goods games (31).  This 
type of regression model treats responses at the minimum (0MUs) and maximum 
(20MUs) as censored.  Past work has shown that applying ordinary least squares 
regression to data like this yields inconsistent results (slope coefficients are biased 
towards zero and intercepts are biased away from zero), while interval regression yields 
consistent results (47).  However, the coefficients in interval regression apply to the 
latent outcome variable (what subjects would do if they were not constrained) rather 
than the observed outcome variable (what subjects actually do).   
To estimate the influence of one subject’s contribution on another’s contribution, 
we include in these regression models the alter’s contribution in the period t – s, where s 
is the degree of separation (alter: s = 1, alter’s alter: s = 2, and so on).  To control for 
serial correlation, we also include ego’s contribution in the period t – s; alternative 
specifications that add additional lags (see SI) generate identical results.  To control for 
period effects, we include an indicator variable for all but one of the periods in which 
ego contributions were observed.  To control for multiple observations of the ego and 
the alter, we use Huber-White sandwich errors that account for errors clustered on each 
ego and each alter.  As a robustness check, we examined whether the effect of alter on 
ego varies depending on whether alter’s contribution is high or low (it does not).  We 
also included the other two group members’ contributions as a control variable, and this 
did not change the results either.   
We further replicated all results treating the group contribution as the unit of 
analysis rather than the alter’s contribution.  And when we analyzed the effect of others’ 
contributions on alter’s influence over ego, we found that alter’s influence remained 
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significant under all conditions, which suggests that analysis at the individual level 
rather than the group level is appropriate (see SI). 
We emphasize that all activity in the experiments was completely anonymous.  
Group composition changed randomly every period so that no one played with the same 
person more than once.  The subjects were ignorant of other players’ experimental 
history; neither past payoffs nor past decisions were known.  Different group 
composition each period and the absence of any history of play ensured that subjects 
could neither develop reputations nor target other subjects for revenge. 
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Figure 1.  Example network drawn from the Fehr-Gaechter (36) public goods 
game experiments.  Here we abstract from the numerous interactions that take 
place between individuals in these experiments to focus on a specific set of 
pathways from alters’ alters to alters to egos.  An “ego” is the focal subject (in 
this example we focus on subject A in period 3); “alters” are those subjects in 
the ego’s group in the previous period (E, I, M in period 2).  The ego has a 
direct network connection to alters because s/he sees each of their 
contributions to the public good before proceeding to the next period.  “Alter’s 
alters” are those individuals in the alters’ groups in the period prior to the 
previous period (F, G, H, J, K, L, N, O, P in period 1).  Note that the ego has no 
direct network connection to any of the alters’ alters and has not seen any of 
their contributions.  However, the ego is indirectly connected to the alters’ alters 
by two degrees of separation via the alters (E, I, M in period 2).  The 
requirement that no two subjects be placed in the same group twice guarantees 
that we can draw a network like this for all 24 subjects in period 3. 
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Figure 2.  The raw data from the Fehr-Gaechter public goods game 
experiments (both the simple version and the version with punishment) show a 
relationship between alter giving in period t and ego giving in period t+1.  
Individuals who gave the maximum or minimum are removed from the data to 
avoid floor and ceiling effects. Horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals 
based on standard errors of the mean. 
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Figure 3.  The effect of alter’s contribution to the public good on ego’s 
contribution is significant and extends up to 3 degrees of separation.  For each 
1MU contributed by alter, ego contributes an additional 0.19 MUs (0.18 MUs in 
the version with punishment) in the next period.  For each 1MU contributed by 
alter’s alter (a contribution ego did not observe), ego contributes an additional 
0.07 MUs (0.05 MUs in the version with punishment) 2 periods later.  And for 
each 1MU contributed by alter’s alter’s alter (3 degrees of separation), the ego 
contributes an additional 0.06 MUs in the public good game with punishment 3 
periods later.  Alters are randomly assigned to egos, and they are only 
assessed at the minimum degree of separation at each point in time.  Estimates 
are from interval regressions, controlling for multiple observations of the same 
ego, multiple observations of the same alter, the ego’s initial contribution in the 
period alter’s contribution was observed, and period fixed effects. Horizontal 
bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 4.  The effect of alter giving on ego giving persists beyond the initial 
period.  Top panels show that alter significantly influences ego’s behavior up to 
4 periods later in the public goods game (left) and 5 periods in the public goods 
game with punishment (right).  Bottom panels show that alter’s alter (2 degrees 
of separation) significantly influences ego’s behavior up to 4 periods later in the 
public goods good game and up to 3 periods later in the public goods game with 
punishment. Estimates are from interval regressions, controlling for multiple 
observations of the same ego, multiple observations of the same alter, the ego’s 
initial contribution in the period alter’s (or alter’s alter’s) contribution was made, 
and period fixed effects. Horizontal bars show 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 5.  A hypothetical cascade. This diagram illustrates the difference 
between the spread of the inter-personal effects across individuals and the 
persistence of effects across time.  We abstract from the numerous interactions 
that take place between individuals in these experiments to focus on a specific, 
illustrative set of pathways.  Cooperative behavior spreads 3 degrees of 
separation: if Eleni increases her contribution to the public good, it benefits 
Lucas (1 degree), who gives more when paired with Erika (2 degrees) in period 
2, who gives more when paired with Jay (3 degrees) in period 3, who gives 
more when paired with Brecken in period 4.  The effects also persist over time, 
so that Lucas gives more when paired with Erika (period 2) and also when 
paired with Lysander (period 3), Bemy (period 4), Sebastian (period 5), and 
Nicholas (period 6).  There is also persistence at 2 degrees of separation, as 
Erika not only gives more when paired with Jay (period 3), but also when paired 
with Harla (period 4) and James (period 5).  All the paths in this illustrative 
cascade are supported by significant results in the experiments, and it is 
important to note that if Eleni decreases her initial contribution then her 
uncooperative behavior can spread and persist as well. 
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In Tables S1a-S1d, we show regression results used to estimate the effects shown 
in Fig. 3 of the main text.  In Tables S1a and S2a-S2d, we show regression results used 
to estimate the effects shown in the top two panels of Fig. 4 of the main text.  In Tables 
S1b and S3a-S3c, we show regression results used to estimate the effects shown in the 
bottom two panels of Fig. 4 of the main text.  In Tables S4a-b we show regression 
results used to estimate the mediation effect of alter’s contribution on the relationship 
between alter’s alter’s contribution and ego’s contribution. In Tables S5a-b we show 
regression results used to estimate the effect of alter’s alter’s and alter’s alter’s alter’s 
punishment behavior on ego’s contribution.  
In Tables S6a and S6b, we demonstrate that egos are not more influenced by 
“selfish” behavior than by “generous” behavior.  In other words, alter’s effect on ego 
does not vary for high and low contributions (increasing alter’s contribution from 0MUs 
and 10MUs has the same effect on ego as increasing from 10MUs to 20MUs).  In Table 
S6a, we use the median contribution of the group as a point of reference to divide high 
and low contributions, and in Table S6b we use the ego’s own contribution as a point of 
reference. 
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In Table S7a and S7b, we explore the possibility that groups rather than specific 
individuals influence ego’s behavior.  In Table S7a, we show that alter significantly 
influences ego even when we include the contributions made by the other two members 
of the group as a control.  In Table S7b, we test the influence of the other two member’s 
contributions on alter’s effect on ego by adding an interaction term to the model.  The 
effect is significant in the public goods game but not in the public goods game with 
punishment, and in both cases the effect size is negligible.  When other members of the 
group increase their contributions, it decreases the influence of alter on ego by 0.004.  If 
we hold other group members’ contributions constant at 10 each, the model suggests 
that an additional MU contributed by alter increases the contribution of ego in the next 
period by 0.160MUs, but if we increase other group members’ contributions by 1MU, 
then an additional MU contributed by alter increases the contribution of ego in the next 
period by 0.156MUs.  And even when others contribute maximally, alter’s effect on ego 
remains significant (p=0.04). 
In Table S8, we show that punishment behavior does not spread from alters to 
ego. 
In Tables S9a-S9c, we study the effect of groups of alters rather than individual 
alters. These models show that the sum total of contributions by all alters in the group 
significantly influence ego’s contribution up to two degrees of separation in the normal 
public goods game and up to three degrees of separation in the public goods game with 
punishment, mirroring the individual-level results in Tables S1a-S1c.  We present these 
results to show that the effects are robust to specification.  However, it is important to 
remember that the estimates in the Table S9 regressions will be downwardly biased 
because they do not account for censoring of individual decisions (47).  For example, a 
group of alters that contributes 15+15+15=45 will have the same value as a group that 
contributes 20+20+5=45, but in the latter group the two individuals who gave 20 may 
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have wanted to give more and could not because of the interval constraints of the 
experiment (20 was the maximum permitted contribution).  In the group-based models, 
an observation is only counted as censored if all three alters contribute the maximum 
(60) so information about censoring at the individual level is lost. 
In Tables S10a and S10b, we add additional lags to the model of alter’s influence 
on ego and alter’s alter’s influence on ego.  Note that the model results reported in 
Table S10 indicate that alter and alter’s alter significantly influence ego in both the 
public goods game and the public goods game with punishment, and the effect sizes are 
nearly identical.  However, the cost of these models is dramatically reduced sample size 
(an therefore the efficiency of estimation) since each additional lag eliminates one 
period of observations.  
Finally, in Table S11, we add 235 fixed effects for each unique subject (except the 
baseline subject, since a constant is in the model).  This method has the advantage of 
controlling for all fixed differences between individuals and/or sessions, but it is well-
known to generate coefficients that are biased towards zero, especially when the number 
of fixed effects is large, as it is here.  In spite of the conservative nature of this 
technique, we find that alter continues to have large and significant effects on ego as in 
the models without fixed effects. 
 
27 
Table S1a: Effect of Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s Contribution 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Public Goods Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 1 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 1 0.98 0.03 0.00 0.82 0.02 0.00 
Period 3 -1.11 0.54 0.04 -0.20 0.30 0.50 
Period 4 -1.11 0.52 0.03 -0.62 0.28 0.03 
Period 5 -1.24 0.54 0.02 -0.16 0.30 0.60 
Period 6 -2.64 0.60 0.00 -0.91 0.37 0.01 
Constant -3.89 0.51 0.00 2.26 0.38 0.00 
Log Likelihood -7721 -8190 
Null Log Likelihood -8499 -9035 
N 3480 3480 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s contribution on ego’s contribution, controlling for 
ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple observations of the same ego and 
multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich standard errors.   
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Table S1b: Effect of Alter’s Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s Contribution 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Public Goods Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Alter’s Contribution Period t – 2 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 2 0.90 0.04 0.00 0.70 0.03 0.00 
Period 4 -0.69 0.60 0.25 -0.56 0.33 0.09 
Period 5 -0.77 0.63 0.23 -0.33 0.34 0.34 
Period 6 -1.60 0.68 0.02 -0.68 0.40 0.09 
Constant -4.57 0.60 0.00 6.49 0.43 0.00 
Log Likelihood -18346 -19870 
Null Log Likelihood -19553 -21156 
N 8316 8316 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s alter’s contribution on ego’s contribution, 
controlling for ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple observations of the 
same ego and multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich standard 
errors.   
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Table S1c: Effect of Alter’s Alter’s Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s 
Contribution 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Public Goods Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Alter’s Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 3 0.03 0.02 0.17 0.06 0.02 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 3 0.77 0.03 0.00 0.65 0.02 0.00 
Period 5 -0.53 0.35 0.14 0.06 0.20 0.77 
Period 6 -1.65 0.40 0.00 -0.63 0.23 0.01 
Constant -4.85 0.47 0.00 7.74 0.39 0.00 
Log Likelihood -13767 -15086 
Null Log Likelihood -14353 -15796 
N 6355 6355 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s alter’s alter’s contribution on ego’s contribution, 
controlling for ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple observations of the 
same ego and multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich standard 
errors.   
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Table S1d: Effect of Alter’s Alter’s Alter’s Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s 
Contribution 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 
Public Goods 
Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Alter’s Alter’s Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 4 0.00 0.07 0.98 -0.02 0.04 0.60 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 4 0.79 0.08 0.00 0.51 0.05 0.00 
Period 6 1.39 1.18 0.24 -1.33 0.48 0.01 
Constant -8.08 1.50 0.00 12.02 1.01 0.00 
Log Likelihood -2097 -2559 
Null Log Likelihood -2161 -2636 
N 1026 1080 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s alter’s alter’s alter’s contribution on ego’s 
contribution, controlling for ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple 
observations of the same ego and multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White 
sandwich standard errors.   
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Table S2a: Effect of Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s Contribution Two 
Periods Later 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Public Goods Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 2 0.15 0.03 0.00 0.15 0.02 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 2 0.90 0.04 0.00 0.70 0.03 0.00 
Period 4 -0.58 0.60 0.33 -0.69 0.33 0.04 
Period 5 -0.58 0.64 0.37 -0.55 0.34 0.11 
Period 6 -1.29 0.69 0.06 -0.96 0.40 0.02 
Constant -5.38 0.66 0.00 5.31 0.48 0.00 
Log Likelihood -6106 -6605 
Null Log Likelihood -6518 -7052 
N 2772 2772 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s contribution on ego’s contribution, controlling for 
ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple observations of the same ego and 
multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich standard errors.   
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Table S2b: Effect of Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s Contribution Three 
Periods Later 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Public Goods Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 3 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 3 0.78 0.04 0.00 0.63 0.03 0.00 
Period 5 -0.64 0.65 0.33 -0.06 0.35 0.86 
Period 6 -1.34 0.71 0.06 -0.73 0.41 0.07 
Constant -5.35 0.74 0.00 7.13 0.63 0.00 
Log Likelihood -4499 -4926 
Null Log Likelihood -4699 -5169 
N 2064 2064 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s contribution on ego’s contribution, controlling for 
ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple observations of the same ego and 
multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich standard errors.   
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Table S2c: Effect of Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s Contribution Four 
Periods Later 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Public Goods Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 4 0.17 0.05 0.00 0.14 0.04 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 4 0.77 0.06 0.00 0.63 0.04 0.00 
Period 6 -1.34 0.78 0.09 -1.03 0.42 0.02 
Constant -8.09 1.02 0.00 7.79 0.73 0.00 
Log Likelihood -2825 -3166 
Null Log Likelihood -2928 -3317 
N 1356 1356 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s contribution on ego’s contribution, controlling for 
ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple observations of the same ego and 
multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich standard errors.   
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Table S2d: Effect of Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s Contribution Five 
Periods Later 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Public Goods Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 5 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.02 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 5 0.65 0.09 0.00 0.58 0.07 0.00 
Constant -9.52 1.51 0.00 9.13 1.16 0.00 
Log Likelihood -1287 -1500 
Null Log Likelihood -1316 -1544 
N 648 648 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s contribution on ego’s contribution, controlling for 
ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple observations of the same ego and 
multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich standard errors.   
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Table S3a: Effect of Alter’s Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s Contribution 
Three Periods Later 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Public Goods Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Alter’s Contribution Period t – 3 0.03 0.02 0.25 0.04 0.02 0.01 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 3 0.78 0.04 0.00 0.64 0.03 0.00 
Period 5 -0.70 0.65 0.29 0.01 0.35 0.98 
Period 6 -1.46 0.70 0.04 -0.59 0.41 0.15 
Constant -4.81 0.66 0.00 7.92 0.54 0.00 
Log Likelihood -13501 -14798 
Null Log Likelihood -14098 -15508 
N 6192 6192 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s alter’s contribution on ego’s contribution, 
controlling for ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple observations of the 
same ego and multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich standard 
errors.   
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Table S3b: Effect of Alter’s Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s Contribution 
Four Periods Later 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Public Goods Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Alter’s Contribution Period t – 4 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.36 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 4 0.76 0.06 0.00 0.63 0.04 0.00 
Period 6 -1.44 0.78 0.06 -0.82 0.43 0.05 
Constant -6.98 0.90 0.00 9.32 0.66 0.00 
Log Likelihood -8489 -9521 
Null Log Likelihood -8785 -9951 
N 4068 4068 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s alter’s contribution on ego’s contribution, 
controlling for ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple observations of the 
same ego and multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich standard 
errors.   
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Table S3c: Effect of Alter’s Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s Contribution Five 
Periods Later 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Public Goods Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Alter’s Contribution Period t – 5 0.01 0.05 0.77 -0.01 0.04 0.85 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 5 0.65 0.09 0.00 0.58 0.07 0.00 
Constant -8.02 1.31 0.00 10.98 1.05 0.00 
Log Likelihood -3867 -4508 
Null Log Likelihood -3948 -4630 
N 1944 1944 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s alter’s contribution on ego’s contribution, 
controlling for ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple observations of the 
same ego and multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich standard 
errors.   
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Table S4a: Mediation Analysis, Public Goods Game 
 Dependent Variable: 
 
Ego’s  
Contribution  
in Period t 
Alter’s  
Contribution  
in Period t-1 
Ego’s  
Contribution  
in Period t 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 2 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.28 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.15 
Alter’s Contribution Period t – 1 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.24 0.03 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 2 0.90 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.90 0.04 0.00 
Period 4 -0.69 0.60 0.25 -2.17 0.67 0.00 -0.38 0.59 0.52 
Period 5 -0.77 0.63 0.23 -3.42 0.67 0.00 -0.29 0.63 0.64 
Period 6 -1.60 0.68 0.02 -4.49 0.72 0.00 -1.03 0.68 0.13 
Constant -4.57 0.60 0.00 4.51 0.62 0.00 -6.27 0.64 0.00 
Log Likelihood -18346 -20756 -18257 
Null Log Likelihood -19553 -20970 -19553 
N 8316 8316 8316 
Interval regression models of ego and alter contributions, controlling for multiple observations of 
the same ego and multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich 
standard errors.  The results in the first model show that the size of the direct effect of alter’s 
alter on ego is 0.07 (95% C.I. 0.03 to 0.10).  We can use the results of the second and third 
model to calculate the size of the indirect effect of alter’s alter on ego that is mediated by alter, 
which is 0.07 (95% C.I. 0.05 to 0.09). 
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Table S4b: Mediation Analysis, Public Goods Game with Punishment 
 Dependent Variable: 
 
Ego’s  
Contribution  
in Period t 
Alter’s  
Contribution  
in Period t – 1 
Ego’s  
Contribution  
in Period t 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 2 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.04 
Alter’s Contribution Period t – 1       0.17 0.02 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 2 0.70 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.38 0.70 0.03 0.00 
Period 4 -0.56 0.33 0.09 0.91 0.38 0.02 -0.70 0.33 0.03 
Period 5 -0.33 0.34 0.34 1.20 0.38 0.00 -0.51 0.34 0.13 
Period 6 -0.68 0.40 0.09 2.46 0.41 0.00 -1.00 0.40 0.01 
Constant 6.49 0.43 0.00 12.17 0.44 0.00 4.40 0.50 0.00 
Log Likelihood -19870 -21631 -19791 
Null Log Likelihood -21156 -21811 -21156 
N 8316 8316 8316 
Interval regression models of ego and alter contributions, controlling for multiple observations of 
the same ego and multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich 
standard errors.  The results in the first model show that the size of the direct effect of alter’s 
alter on ego is 0.05 (95% C.I. 0.03 to 0.08).  We can use the results of the second and third 
model to calculate the size of the indirect effect of alter’s alter on ego that is mediated by alter, 
which is 0.03 (95% C.I. 0.02 to 0.05). 
40 
Table S5a: Effect of Alter’s Received Punishment on Ego’s Contribution 
Two Rounds Later 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Coef. S.E. p 
Punishment Rec’d by Alter in Period t – 2 0.13 0.05 0.02 
Alter’s Contribution in Period t – 2 0.18 0.03 0.00 
Punishment Rec’d by Ego in Period t – 2 0.45 0.07 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution in Period t – 2 0.86 0.03 0.00 
Period 4 -1.14 0.33 0.00 
Period 5 -0.98 0.34 0.00 
Period 6 -1.45 0.40 0.00 
Constant 1.82 0.62 0.00 
Log Likelihood -6565 
Null Log Likelihood -7052 
N 2772 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s received punishment on ego’s contribution, 
controlling for ego’s prior received punishment and ego’s and alter’s prior contribution, period 
fixed effects, and multiple observations of the same ego and multiple observations of the same 
alter using Huber-White sandwich standard errors.   
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Table S5b: Effect of Alter’s Alter’s Received Punishment on Ego’s 
Contribution Three Rounds Later 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Coef. S.E. p 
Punishment Rec’d by Alter’s Alter in Period t – 3 0.09 0.07 0.25 
Alter’s Alter’s Contribution in Period t – 3 0.02 0.04 0.64 
Punishment Rec’d by Ego in Period t – 3 0.30 0.08 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution in Period t – 3 0.75 0.05 0.00 
Period 5 -0.08 0.41 0.84 
Period 6 -0.74 0.45 0.10 
Constant 6.04 0.90 0.00 
Log Likelihood -5004 
Null Log Likelihood -5244 
N 2118 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s alter’s received punishment on ego’s contribution, 
controlling for ego’s prior received punishment and ego’s and alter’s alter’s prior contribution, 
period fixed effects, and multiple observations of the same ego and multiple observations of the 
same alter’s alter using Huber-White sandwich standard errors.   
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Table S6a: Effect of Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s Contribution is Similar 
Regardless of Whether Alter’s Contribution is High or Low  
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Public Goods Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 1 X  
Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 1 > Median -0.23 0.14 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.87 
Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 1 > Median 3.23 0.88 0.00 -0.28 1.86 0.88 
Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 1  0.23 0.13 0.07 0.17 0.03 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 1 0.98 0.03 0.00 0.82 0.02 0.00 
Period 3 -1.09 0.54 0.04 -0.20 0.30 0.51 
Period 4 -1.06 0.52 0.04 -0.62 0.28 0.03 
Period 5 -1.18 0.54 0.03 -0.15 0.30 0.62 
Period 6 -2.53 0.60 0.00 -0.91 0.37 0.01 
Constant -4.28 0.55 0.00 2.28 0.42 0.00 
Log Likelihood -7714 -8190 
Null Log Likelihood -8499 -9035 
N 3480 3480 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s contribution on ego’s contribution, controlling for 
ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple observations of the same ego and 
multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich standard errors.  
Interaction term shows the differential effect of being a higher-than-median (within the group) 
contributor.  The interaction term is not significant, suggesting the ego does not pay more 
attention to higher-than-median contributors.  
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Table S6b: Effect of Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s Contribution is Similar 
Regardless of Whether Alter’s Contribution is Above or Below Ego’s 
Contribution  
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Public Goods Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 1 X  
Ego’s Contrib. > Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 1 -0.11 0.07 0.11 -0.02 0.05 0.70 
Ego’s Contrib. > Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 1 1.83 0.69 0.00 0.51 0.77 0.51 
Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 1  0.26 0.04 0.00 0.20 0.04 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 1 0.93 0.04 0.00 0.80 0.03 0.00 
Period 3 -1.10 0.54 0.04 -0.21 0.30 0.49 
Period 4 -1.13 0.52 0.03 -0.62 0.28 0.03 
Period 5 -1.28 0.54 0.02 -0.16 0.30 0.60 
Period 6 -2.64 0.60 0.00 -0.91 0.37 0.01 
Constant -4.67 0.60 0.00 1.93 0.61 0.00 
Log Likelihood -7717 -8190 
Null Log Likelihood -8499 -9035 
N 3480 3480 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s contribution on ego’s contribution, controlling for 
ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple observations of the same ego and 
multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich standard errors.  
Interaction term shows the differential effect of being a higher-than-median (within the group) 
contributor.  The interaction term is not significant, suggesting the ego does not pay more 
attention to alters who contribute more than they did. 
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Table S7a: Effect of Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s Contribution, 
Controlling for Others’ Contributions 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Public Goods Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 1 0.17 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.02 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 1 0.95 0.03 0.00 0.81 0.02 0.00 
Other’s Contribution Period t – 1 0.17 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.00 
Period 3 -0.77 0.53 0.15 -0.61 0.29 0.03 
Period 4 -0.34 0.51 0.51 -1.34 0.28 0.00 
Period 5 -0.22 0.54 0.56 -1.01 0.29 0.00 
Period 6 -1.47 0.61 0.59 -2.06 0.37 0.00 
Constant -6.70 0.59 0.00 -1.90 0.44 0.00 
Log Likelihood -7673 -8101 
Null Log Likelihood -8499 -9035 
N 3480 3480 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s contribution on ego’s contribution, controlling for 
ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple observations of the same ego and 
multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich standard errors.   
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Table S7b: Effect of Interaction Between Alter’s Contribution and Others’ 
Contributions on Ego’s Contribution 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Public Goods Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 1 X 
Other’s Contribution Period t – 1 -0.004 0.002 0.05 -0.001 0.002 0.49 
Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 1 0.24 0.04 0.00 0.21 0.06 0.00 
Other’s Contribution Period t – 1 0.20 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.03 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 1 0.95 0.03 0.00 0.81 0.02 0.00 
Period 3 -0.81 0.53 0.13 -0.63 0.29 0.03 
Period 4 -0.38 0.51 0.45 -1.34 0.28 0.00 
Period 5 -0.25 0.54 0.64 -1.01 0.29 0.00 
Period 6 -1.48 0.61 0.02 -2.05 0.37 0.00 
Constant -7.20 0.62 0.00 -2.45 0.81 0.00 
Log Likelihood -7671 -8101 
Null Log Likelihood -8499 -9035 
N 3480 3480 
Interval regression models of effect of an interaction between alter’s contribution and others’ 
contributions on ego’s contribution, controlling for alter’s contribution, others’ contributions, 
ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple observations of the same ego and 
multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich standard errors.   
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Table S8: Effect of Alter’s Punishment Behavior on Ego’s Punishment 
Behavior 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Punishment in the  
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p 
Alters’ Punishments Directed at Ego in Period t – 1 0.01 0.04 0.83 
Ego’s Punishments in Period t – 1 0.72 0.06 0.00 
Period 3 0.84 0.36 0.02 
Period 4 0.50 0.31 0.10 
Period 5 0.21 0.33 0.54 
Period 6 0.13 0.30 0.67 
Constant -0.92 0.31 0.00 
Log Likelihood -2150 
Null Log Likelihood -2306 
N 1160 
Interval regression models of effect of alters’ punishments of ego on ego’s punishments of 
others in the next round, controlling for ego’s prior punishment behavior, period fixed effects, 
and multiple observations of the same ego using Huber-White sandwich standard errors.   
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Table S9a: Effect of Alter Group’s Contribution on Ego’s Contribution 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Public Goods Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter Group’s Contrib. Period t – 1 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 1 0.56 0.04 0.00 0.61 0.04 0.00 
Period 3 -0.45 0.57 0.43 -0.31 0.39 0.42 
Period 4 -0.40 0.52 0.36 -0.81 0.30 0.01 
Period 5 -0.03 0.49 0.95 -0.64 0.38 0.10 
Period 6 -0.69 0.49 0.16 -1.48 0.42 0.00 
Constant 0.44 0.51 0.40 1.56 0.38 0.00 
Log Likelihood -3622 -3249 
Null Log Likelihood -3927 -3583 
N 1160 1160 
Interval regression models of effect of alter group’s total contributions on ego’s contribution, 
controlling for ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple observations of the 
same ego and multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White sandwich standard 
errors.   
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Table S9b: Effect of Alter’s Alter Group’s Contribution on Ego’s 
Contribution 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 
Public Goods 
Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Alter Group’s Contribution Period t – 2 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 2 0.48 0.04 0.00 0.49 0.05 0.00 
Period 4 -0.34 0.46 0.46 -0.55 0.31 0.07 
Period 5 0.05 0.61 0.93 -0.67 0.50 0.18 
Period 6 -0.21 0.61 0.73 -1.18 0.55 0.03 
Constant 0.48 0.84 0.57 5.28 1.11 0.00 
Log Likelihood -2959 -2682 
Null Log Likelihood -3109 -2837 
N 924 924 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s alter group’s total contributions on ego’s 
contribution, controlling for ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple 
observations of the same ego and multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White 
sandwich standard errors.   
49 
Table S9c: Effect of Alter’s Alter’s Alter Group’s Contribution on Ego’s 
Contribution 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 Public Goods Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Alter’s Alter Group’s Contribution 
Period t – 3 0.02 0.03 0.47 0.11 0.03 0.00 
Ego’s Contribution Period t – 3 0.39 0.05 0.00 0.43 0.05 0.00 
Period 5 -0.06 0.45 0.90 -0.39 0.33 0.24 
Period 6 -0.39 0.57 0.50 -1.28 0.45 0.00 
Constant 1.61 0.97 0.10 5.75 1.26 0.00 
Log Likelihood -2228 -2031 
Null Log Likelihood -2299 -2116 
N 688 688 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s alter’s alter group’s total contributions on ego’s 
contribution, controlling for ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, and multiple 
observations of the same ego and multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White 
sandwich standard errors.   
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Table S10a: Effect of Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s Contribution in a 
Model That Includes Additional Lags of Ego’s Behavior 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 
Public Goods 
Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 1 0.23 0.05 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.00 
Ego’s Contrib. Period t – 1 0.80 0.06 0.00 0.55 0.07 0.00 
Ego’s Contrib. Period t – 2 0.32 0.07 0.00 0.21 0.07 0.00 
Ego’s Contrib. Period t – 3 0.03 0.07 0.62 0.03 0.06 0.64 
Ego’s Contrib. Period t – 4 0.18 0.06 0.00 0.27 0.06 0.00 
Period 6 -0.99 0.65 0.13 -1.10 0.37 0.00 
Constant -9.17 0.80 0.00 -0.30 0.80 0.71 
Log Likelihood -2621 -3027 
Null Log Likelihood -2928 -3317 
N 1356 1356 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s contribution on ego’s contribution, controlling for 
ego’s prior contributions in periods t-1, t-2, t-3, and t-4, a fixed effect for period 6 (vs. period 5), 
and multiple observations of the same ego and multiple observations of the same alter using 
Huber-White sandwich standard errors. 
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Table S10b: Effect of Alter’s Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s Contribution in 
a Model That Includes Additional Lags of Ego’s Behavior 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 
Public Goods 
Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 1 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.00 
Ego’s Contrib. Period t – 1 0.70 0.07 0.00 0.50 0.06 0.00 
Ego’s Contrib. Period t – 2 0.22 0.07 0.00 0.15 0.06 0.02 
Ego’s Contrib. Period t – 3 0.25 0.06 0.00 0.30 0.06 0.00 
Period 6 -0.65 0.72 0.36 -0.85 0.40 0.03 
Constant -8.66 0.85 0.00 3.41 0.69 0.00 
Log Likelihood -8187 -9280 
Null Log Likelihood -8785 -9951 
N 4068 4068 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s alter’s contribution on ego’s contribution, 
controlling for ego’s prior contributions in periods t-1, t-2, and t-3, a fixed effect for period 6 (vs. 
period 5), and multiple observations of the same ego and multiple observations of the same 
alter using Huber-White sandwich standard errors. 
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Table S11: Effect of Alter’s Contribution on Ego’s Contribution in a Model 
That Includes Ego Fixed Effects 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Ego’s Contribution in Period t 
 
Public Goods 
Game 
Public Goods Game  
with Punishment 
 Coef. S.E. p Coef. S.E. p 
Alter’s Contrib. Period t – 1 0.17 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.00 
Period 3 -2.41 0.42 0.00 1.16 0.24 0.00 
Period 4 -4.02 0.40 0.00 1.52 0.23 0.00 
Period 5 -5.41 0.43 0.00 2.40 0.25 0.00 
Period 6 -7.36 0.50 0.00 2.06 0.30 0.00 
Constant 0.05 1.58 0.00 13.21 0.38 0.00 
Log Likelihood -6699 -7292 
Null Log Likelihood -8499 -9035 
N 3480 3480 
Interval regression models of effect of alter’s contribution on ego’s contribution, controlling for 
ego’s prior contribution, period fixed effects, ego fixed effects for 235 subjects, and multiple 
observations of the same ego and multiple observations of the same alter using Huber-White 
sandwich standard errors.  Coefficients on fixed effects not shown. 
 
